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Abstract. In “Real Patterns” Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of
beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett’s analogy
into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents
but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by em-
pirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or “noisiness” of
what someone believes, and the same belief can be described by different sentences or propo-
sitions (which is illustrated by Dennett’s analogy, some Gettier cases, and Frege’s puzzle), but
in some contexts some of these competing descriptions are misleading or even false. Faithful
(or truthful) description must be guided by a principle (or principles) related to the principle
of charity: belief descriptions should not attribute irrationality to the believer or have other
kinds of “deviant” implications.
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1. Belief reports
The traditional view on beliefs and belief reports is that a belief report specifies the
content of a belief and that that content is (something very much like) a proposition.
In “On Sense and Reference” (1892), Frege showed that — together with some other
widely shared assumptions about language — this traditional view has paradoxical
implications, however. Frege’s “puzzle” is that, if x believes that y is F under one
name (for y) but not under another (because x doesn’t realize that the two names
refer to the same individual), then x holds contradictory beliefs (or at least appears
to do so). Frege’s own example was about Hesperus and Phosphorus, but modern il-
lustrations are typically about Superman: Lois Lane believes that Superman is strong
and that Clark Kent is not strong, but (unbeknownst to Lois Lane) Clark Kent is Su-
perman, and thus, Lois Lane believes that the same individual is both strong and not
strong.
Frege’s solution to this puzzle was to give up direct reference and semantic inno-
cence, the aforementioned “other widely shared assumptions about language”. (Di-
rect reference is the idea that singular terms point at things in the world directly. Se-
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mantic innocence is the assumption that the meaning of words and phrases remains
constant across linguistic contexts.) According to Frege, terms have both a sense and
a reference. While “Superman” and “Clark Kent” refer to the same individual, they
do not have the same sense, and therefore, the terms “Superman” and “Clark Kent”
in Lois Lane’s two beliefs are not semantically innocent,1 and reference is mediated
by sense (and thus not direct).
A problem very similar to Frege’s puzzle was discussed by Quine (1976 [1956]) in
the context of quantification into beliefs. Quine’s “Ortcutt” case is formally identical
to Frege’s puzzle except that the two beliefs involve references to the same individual
by means of different descriptions rather than different names. “Ralph believes that
the man in the brown hat is a spy” and “Ralph does not believe that the man seen at
the beach is a spy” (p.187), but unbeknownst to Ralph, both descriptions refer to the
same man named “Ortcutt”.
David Kaplan (1968) proposed a solution to Quine’s quantification problem that
was strongly influenced by Frege and that also solves Frege’s puzzle. A belief of
x that y is F if represented as α is formalized as “R(α, y, x) ∧ xB_α is F ^” in
which the two-place predicate B stands for “believes that” and the three-place pred-
icate R for representation. Lois Lane has two representations of the same individ-
ual, one as Superman and one as Clark Kent, and has different beliefs about these
two representations. Thus, it is the case that ∃α[R(α, s, l) ∧ lB_α is strong^] and
∃α[R(α, s, l)∧¬(lB_α is strong^)] (in which s stands for Superman/Clark Kent and l
for Lois Lane), but that does not imply a contradiction. (See Kaplan 1968, pp.206–7
for his analogous treatment of the Ortcutt case.)
Kaplan defines representation (in the here relevant sense) as follows:α represents
y to x — symbolized as “R(α, y, x)” — if and only if α denotes y , α is a name of y
for x , and α is sufficiently vivid.2 What α is a name of (for x) is determined by α’s
“genetic character”. “The genetic character of a name in a given person’s usage will
account for how he acquired the name, that is how he heard of such a thing and, if he
believes that such a thing exists, how he came to believe it” (p.200). A representation,
then, is something like a “mental file” or “mental dossier” x has (formed) of y , and
like Frege’s senses, such representations mediate between names (or descriptions,
as in the Ortcutt case) and referents. Nevertheless, the two notions should not be
confused: mental files or dossiers are not Fregean Senses.
Frege distinguished the sense of a term or name from its representation (Vorstel-
lung). “The latter is subjective, private and psychological, the former is objective and
communicable” (Kremer 2010, p.260). Mental files or dossiers are subjective, private
and psychological and, thus, Vorstellungen (representations). The distinction matters
for how one conceives of the content of beliefs. According to Frege, the sense of a sen-
tence is a thought (Gedanke), which is “not the subjective activity of thinking, but its
objective content, which is capable of being the common property of many [thinkers]”
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(1892, p.32n; my translation). The senses of thoughts are constructed out of the
building blocks provided by the senses of words (Kremer 2010, p.289), and both
kinds of senses are equally objective and sharable. Fregean thoughts (Gedanken),
then, are very similar to propositions: they are objective, truth-apt, sharable, struc-
tured, and stand in logical relations to each other. (See also Taschek 2010.) Hence,
while Frege gives up semantic innocence and direct reference, he (more or less) ad-
heres to the aforementioned traditional view of beliefs and belief reports. Whether
the same is the case for a theory that substitutes mental files for senses as suggested
by Kaplan’s account is debatable, however. Propositions are typically assumed to be
sharable and, therefore, must have sharable building blocks, but the genetic character
of a name or term is inherently subjective and unique.
While the Fregean approach to solving the puzzle by giving up direct reference
and semantic innocence might work, many philosophers find the prize too high to
pay, and many other solutions (or attempts at solutions, at least) have been proposed.
(For overviews, see Richard 1997, Brogaard 2007, or McKay and Nelson 2010.) A
prominent kind of solution appeals to hidden indexicals such as contexts or ways
of believing. For example, Mark Crimmins and John Perry (1989) argue that Lois
Lane’s two beliefs have the same content, but differ in how she believes that content.
And according to Mark Richard (1990), what makes a belief report true is that the
reporting sentence faithfully represents what the believer believes, and:
What counts as faithful representation varies from context to context with
our interests and expectations. Context places certain restrictions on what
can represent what. Sometimes they are very specific. . . Sometimes context
is silent. . . , and expressions are free to represent any expressions with which
they corefer. (pp.3–4)
Whether such solutions succeed and to what extent they respect (both) direct
reference and semantic innocence is controversial. It seems that every proposed so-
lution conflicts with at least one intuitively plausible principle. Nevertheless, all of
the solutions mentioned (as well as most of those not mentioned) agree in at least
one respect: they hold on to the aforementioned traditional view — that is, they as-
sume that belief reports specify the contents of beliefs, and that those contents are
(very similar to) propositions. According to Kent Bach (1997) these assumptions are
the root of the problem, however. A “belief report does not quite what it appears to
do, namely, say what someone believes. That is, it does not specify what the person
believes but merely describes it” (p.215), and therefore, the “specification assump-
tion” is false. Bach argues that “belief reports are semantically incomplete” — that
is, they are “not true or false independently of context” (p.238).
Largely independent from the dispute about belief reports and Frege’s puzzle
there has been simultaneous debate about the metaphysics of beliefs (although there
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are obvious links between the two). In the metaphysical debate representationalists
spar with dispositionalists about the nature of beliefs, and together they confront
eliminativists and instrumentalists on the question of the existence of beliefs. (For an
overview, see Schwitzgebel 2015.) In the latter (sub-) debate, Daniel Dennett took
a position that he himself considered a kind of realism, but that is more commonly
labeled “instrumentalist”. The main paper outlining his position is “Real Patterns”
(1991). The argument in that paper builds on the analogy that gave it its title: pat-
terns and their reality or unreality.
While Dennett used his pattern analogy in an argument about the existence of
beliefs, in this paper I will use it to develop an account of belief reports. That account
agrees with Bach’s descriptivism (i.e. it holds that belief reports merely describe be-
liefs), but fills in various details (mainly about the content of beliefs on which Bach is
mostly silent) in a way that bears similarities to Kaplan’s neo-Fregeanism as well as
to hidden-indexicalism or contextualism. In the next section, I will unpack the key el-
ement of Dennett’s analogy, “noise”. After that, section 3 discusses the formal nature
of belief reports, argues for a principle to decide between competing, more or less
“noisy” — that is, more or less specific or detailed — belief descriptions, the principle
of (avoiding) deviant implications (PDI), and illustrates that principle with a kind of
Gettier case. The much shorter fourth section suggests a solution to Frege’s puzzle
based on the descriptivist view of belief reports defended in section 3, and a solution
of Kripke’s puzzles by means of PDI. The final section summarizes this paper’s main
claims, compares them with Bach’s descriptivism, and concludes that PDI and the
solution to Frege’s puzzle in section 4 are really specific versions of the principle of
charity. The remainder of this opening section introduces the pattern analogy.
Daniel Dennett’s (1991) argument in “Real Patterns” starts with the introduction
of a pattern named “bar code” that consists of a row of nine 10 × 10-dot squares
alternately black and white. To this base pattern more or less “noise” is added to
create the six “frames” shown in figure 1.3 The amount of noise added ranges from
1% in D to 50% in F . (Noise ratios are shown in the figure.)
Figure 1: A recreation of Dennett’s six “frames” (with noise ratios)
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In what these frames are an analogy of it is not the case that the pattern is there
first and the noise added later, however. Rather, the frames — as such, with the noise
— are there first, and the question is whether the pattern is there in those frames; or
whether, when, and/or to what extent the pattern can be said to describe (some of)
those frames.
Dennett argues that “a pattern exists in some data — is real — if there is a de-
scription of the data that is more efficient than the bit map, whether or not anyone
can concoct it” (p.34). However, we can take different attitudes towards patterns and
the noise “obscuring” them at different times, depending on circumstances, purposes,
and so forth.
Sometimes we care about exact description or reproduction of detail, at
whatever cost. From this perspective, a real pattern in frame A is bar code
with the following exceptions: 7, 8, 11,. . . At other times we care about the
noise, but not where in particular it occurs. From this perspective, a real
pattern in frame A is bar code with 25% noise. And sometimes, we simply
tolerate or ignore the noise. From this perspective, a real pattern in frame A
is simply: bar code. (p.35; italics in original)
The key question for Dennett is whether the pattern, bar code, is really there in frame
A. Beliefs are subject to “noise” in a way similar to the patterns in figure 1, and con-
sequently, a careful consideration of this key question is intended to shed light on
the question about the reality of beliefs. Dennett further develops his argument par-
tially by means of another analogy (the “game of life”) and by contrasting his views
to those of Fodor, Churchland, Davidson, and Rorty. His conclusion is that beliefs
(like patterns) are real, but also “up to the observer” (p.49), although this apparent
relativism is constrained by pragmatic considerations similar to those in, for exam-
ple, Quine’s “On What There Is” (1964 [1948]) or Word and Object (1960, especially
chapter 1, §6).
Regardless of whether bar code “is really there” in frame A (and of what exactly
that is supposed to mean), we can also ask the question whether, when, and/or to
what extent it is correct (or appropriate, or faithful) to describe frame A as bar code.
That — rather than the existential question — is the key question here, in this paper.
And to answer that question we need to start with an analysis of the “noise”.
2. Noise
“Noise” is an ambiguous term, but much of this ambiguity can be contained by dis-
tinguishing four “stages” in the term’s history. If we skip etymology (which links the
word to “nausea”), the oldest and most basic sense of “noise” is inharmonious and/or
unwanted (and often loud) sound. Street noise and factory noise are examples of
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noise in this sense. After the invention of recording technology, the term gained a
new use in reference to hiss and other accidental and unwanted artifacts in record-
ings of sound. Let’s call this kind of noise “audio noise”. From the 1940s a new tech-
nical notion of noise to describe various hissing sounds developed. Noise in this sense
is a random signal in (usually) all (audible) frequencies, although the intensity per
frequency depends on the kind — or color — of noise. White noise is the best known
example. The fourth stage originates in the use of “noise” as metaphor. Noise in this
sense is any disturbance or random fluctuation in a sign or signal. Let’s call this kind
of noise “signal noise”.
The notion of signal noise is rooted in an apparent analogy to audio noise, but
differs from it in a fundamental way. Signal noise is a disruption of an originally
pure and undisrupted signal. The signal was there first, and the noise only came
later. In the case of audio noise, however, there never was a “pure” and undisrupted
signal (except, perhaps, in some electronic music). Audio noise is an inherent and
unavoidable part of any sound recording — it is there from the start.
The noise in Dennett’s pattern analogy can be understood as a kind of signal noise
or as analogous to audio noise. If it is understood as signal noise, then the pattern
bar code is there first, and the noise is a later disruption of that pattern. (This is, of
course, how the frames in figure 1 are created, but that does not necessarily matter
for how the analogy is supposed to work.) If it is understood as analogous to audio
noise, then the pattern bar code is an idealization that never existed separate from
the noise. Dennett’s argument depends on the second understanding of noise in the
analogy. If the pattern bar code is already there (and merely disrupted), then it doesn’t
make much sense to ask — as Dennett does — whether the pattern is “really there”.
The point of the analogy (or part of the point, at least), is that there is no “signal”
separate from the noise. The frames are what is given, and the pattern is merely seen
in the frames. What we see as the signal is an idealization, and Dennett’s question
is about the reality of that idealization. What concerns us here, however, is not the
idealization’s reality, but its truthfulness, faithfulness, or accuracy.
2.1. “Noisy” beliefs
The frames in figure 1 are analogous to beliefs. If Hanako believes that John drives
a Toyota, then the proposition “John drives a Toyota” is analogous to the pattern bar
code. “John drives a Toyota” describes Hanako’s belief in the same way that bar code
describes frame A. However, Dennett observes that frame A can also be described as
bar code with 25% noise (and so forth) and similarly, there may be more (or less)
detailed descriptions of Hanako’s belief. If John’s Toyota is green and Hanako knows
that, then “John drives a green Toyota” may be an alternative description of the same
belief (but whether it is depends on what Hanako exactly believes, of course).
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Dennett wonders whether bar code is really there in frame A. Analogously, the
question here is whether the proposition “John drives a Toyota” is really there in
Hanako’s belief, or in Hanako’s mind when she believes that John drives a Toyota. A
question whether a proposition or propositional description “is really there” sounds
odd, however, partially because it conflicts with how we normally talk about propo-
sitions and beliefs, and partially because of ambiguities in the notion of belief.
There is a common distinction between dispositional and occurrent beliefs, where
the former are beliefs one holds in the back of one’s mind and that aren’t presently
conscious, while the second are conscious thoughts. Some philosophers, such as Tim
Crane (2001), have argued that there are no occurrent beliefs, however, and ac-
cording to Peter Carruthers (2011; 2013) conscious thoughts don’t fit the functional
profile of beliefs. Nevertheless, even if there are no occurrent beliefs in a strict sense
of “belief”, if Hanako has an occurrent thought that John drives a Toyota and she
(dispositionally) believes in the truth of that thought, that is close enough.
Secondly, dispositional beliefs can be explicit or implicit (Dennett 1978). Explicit
beliefs are beliefs one already, knowingly has, while implicit beliefs are beliefs that
one would form in the right circumstances given the explicit beliefs one already has.
If Hanako’s belief is an explicit belief and she knows that Toyotas are Japanese cars,
then she implicitly believes that John drives a Japanese car. (She’d probably also
implicitly believe that John’s car isn’t made of paper, for example, as well as very
many other things.)
If there are alternative descriptions of one and the same belief as suggested by
Dennett’s analogy, then there is no clear boundary between implicit beliefs and al-
ternative descriptions of the same belief. If Hanako believes that John drives a green
Toyota, then “John drives a Toyota” could either be an alternative (less specific) de-
scription of the same belief, or it could be a description of an implicit, different belief.
While in this example it seems quite plausible that these are two descriptions of one
and the same belief, it is easy to come up with cases in which that is far less clear.
(Does “John drive a car” describe the same belief?) By definition, an implicit belief
is a belief that a person doesn’t explicitly hold already, so if some proposition q de-
scribes a belief that can also be described by p, and p→ q, then, by virtue of the fact
that q describes a belief that the subject already explicitly holds, q cannot describe
an implicit belief; but the other way around, that q is not a description of an implicit
belief is insufficient to conclude that q and p describe the same belief. (On the prob-
lem of distinguishing implicit beliefs from alternative descriptions of the same belief,
see also section 3.4.)
For now, we’ll ignore implicit beliefs and assume that Hanako’s belief that John
drives a Toyota is either an occurrent thought or an explicit, dispositional belief. In
either case, there are two sources of noise — physical and mental — but there are
some differences in their role and nature.
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Physical “noise” is the least interesting of the two. Features of Hanako’s brain
architecture (which is partly dependent on her experiences), but also mind-altering
drugs, electronic brain stimulation, and aspects of the physical environment create
the “noisy” mental environment (or brain states) in which the thought that John
drives a Toyota occurs, but Hanako’s brain architecture and other physical/environ-
mental factors also affect a dispositional belief with similar content.
Mental “noise” comes from other beliefs and from what David Kaplan (1968)
called the “genetic character” of their components (see section 1). If Hanako has an
occurrent thought that John drives a Toyota, then that thought occurs in a context
that is constituted primarily by other beliefs (and to a lesser extent by the aforemen-
tioned physical factors). This includes preceding and simultaneous thoughts, percep-
tual beliefs, and related dispositional beliefs. Some of these may be conscious, but
many will be unconscious. And all of these adjacent, overlapping, and co-occurring
beliefs affect the content of the thought that John drives a Toyota. To translate this
into the patterns analogy: frame A is preceded by and co-occurs with other frames
(that are or can be described by other patterns) and these various frames infect and
bleed into each other.
The most important kind of mental “noise” is due to the interrelatedeness or inter-
dependence of many of our (or Hanako’s) beliefs. Donald Davidson (e.g. 2001[1997])
famously argued for a kind of holism that ultimately connects all of our beliefs, but
we don’t have to go that far (although I think Davidson was right in this respect):
it is sufficient to realize that “John” is not some kind of abstract or empty marker in
Hanako’s mind, but refers to a person she knows, a person she has shared experiences
with, a person she has memories about.
Hanako has very many other beliefs about John — that he is tall, that they had
lunch together last Monday, that he has a cat, and so forth — and importantly, she
doesn’t have a concept of JOHN separate from those beliefs. Rather, these beliefs
together make up her concept (or mental file or dossier — see section 1) of John, in
the same way that my beliefs about tables make up my concept of TABLE. (Or in other
words, there is no John pattern that is later disrupted by noise, but rather, Hanako’s
concept of John emerges from the noise.) That doesn’t mean that all of those beliefs
are of equal (John-defining) importance (or equally salient) in all circumstances,
however. In the contrary, thinking about John’s car most likely activates (consciously
or unconsciously) different stored beliefs about John than thinking about last time
she had lunch with him, and consequently, the John in Hanako’s beliefs is a context-
dependent and ever-changing weighted subset of her beliefs about John.
Moreover, the same is true for the other notions involved in the belief that John
drives a Toyota. The concept of DRIVING A CAR, Hanako’s mental representations of
TOYOTA and JOHN’S TOYOTA, and the idea of JOHN DRIVING A CAR aren’t abstract
or empty markers either, but are similarly constituted by the beliefs in which they
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figure.
The implication is rather obvious: Hanako doesn’t just believe that John drives
a Toyota, she believes that some specific John drives (in some specific way) some
specific Toyota. It is a green Toyota with a long scratch on the left passenger door,
and with stains on the floor from the time when Hanako threw up in his car after
his driving style made her sick, and so forth. Much of this remains unconscious, of
course, but it is this kind of noise that determines what Hanako exactly believes. Even
if Hanako has an occurrent thought “John drives a Toyota”, it is inescapably that John,
and that Toyota.
“Mental contents are more specific than the ‘that’-clauses used to characterize
them”, wrote Kent Bach (1997, p.235). That is what the noise in Dennett’s analogy
represents: the inherent specificity of our mental contents; all the idiosyncratic details
in the mental representations that give content to our beliefs. And this noise is not a
disruption of an originally pure signal. Rather, this noise constitutes the “signal”.
2.2. “Noisy” mental content
A few years ago, at a small conference involving philosophers and neuroscientists,
one of the neuroscientists in attendance claimed (during lunch break) that given
enough time with a subject, he would be able to tell what that subject is thinking just
by means of neuroimaging — he would be able to “read” mental contents from an
fMRI scan. There was a catch, however: with a different subject, he’d (almost) have
to start over again.
I don’t know whether this neuroscientist was bragging — provided that the men-
tal contents he expected to identify are not excessively fine-grained, his claim doesn’t
seem implausible to me — but it doesn’t really matter, because it’s the “catch” that is
most interesting.
Let us re-apply Dennett’s pattern analogy. This time, think of the six frames in
figure 1 as fMRI scans or some other kinds of images of brain activity, and think of
the pattern bar code as a kind of mental content or mental event — remembering the
smell of freshly cut grass, for example. The “noise” that to a greater or lesser extent
“obscures” the pattern/mental event in the six frames/fMRI scans is the noise we
encountered above: it is due to subtle differences in brain architecture, to preceding
and co-occurring mental activity, and most importantly, to different memories, differ-
ent desires, different beliefs, and so forth. When one person remembers the smell of
freshly cut grass, she may remember (or unconsciously activate a memory of) some
particular event that involved freshly cut grass, but another person will have different
memories and different associations, and will, therefore, activate (however subtly)
different networks of mental contents and their neural correlates.
While remembering as a general mental activity will involve very similar parts of
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the brain in most people,4 the details of the content of the memory, and whatever
is linked to that mental content through association and (implicitly, unconsciously)
activated related memories differs from person to person. And these differences can
be so vast that it makes no sense to speak of a pattern corresponding to “freshly cut
grass”, except in one brain, and in one short time period (because new experiences
will change an individual’s memories and mental associations). When it comes to
specific mental contents rather than broad kinds of mental activities, frame F (in
figure 1) may be the closest analogy. In other words, while it is possible to link types
of mental activity (like remembering) to types of brain activation patterns — the
hippocampus appears to play a key role in this kind of memory, for example — there
is no type/type relation on the level of mental contents. There is, of course, a specific
brain activation pattern that corresponds with one person’s thought of freshly cut
grass at one particular time and in one particular set of circumstances, but that is
token identity, not type identity.
When it comes to what (rather than that) people are thinking, feeling, remem-
bering, desiring, and so forth, Dennett’s analogy implies a rejection of type identity
between the mental and the neuro-physical, while assuming token identity. (It doesn’t
in any way prove or imply token identity, but giving up token identity in addition to
type identity would completely disconnect the mind from the brain, leading to some
untenable kind of substance dualism.) Probably, the best known theory of mind and
mental content based on token identity is Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism
(2001 [1970]; 2005 [1993]; 2005 [1995]), but there are fundamental differences
between that theory and what I am suggesting here. Davidson’s anomalous monism
is an a priori argument that infers monism from the assumption of anomalism. Here,
I am assuming (physicalist) monism (on more or less Quinean naturalistic grounds)
and using Dennett’s analogy to argue against type identity (but not for anomalism).5
Davidson’s anomalism holds that there are no strict (causal) laws that connect
mental to other (non-mental and mental) events. A strict law states that a certain
kind of event in certain conditions is sufficient for the occurrence of another kind of
event. Laws in physics and chemistry, for example, are strict, but mental “laws” —
according to Davidson — are not. Thus, it is a strict law that heating water to 100
degrees Celsius will cause it to boil, but it is not a strict law that thinking of umeboshi
(Japanese dried, pickled plum) will cause hypersalivation. Supposedly, the second
is not a strict law because there are many conditions that could prevent someone
from (almost) drooling while thinking of umeboshi. The subject may suffer from
some medical condition, for example. Someone unfamiliar with umeboshi would, of
course, also not experience hypersalivation, but that is because such a person cannot
think of umeboshi. However, there also are conditions — such as high pressure —
that would prevent water from boiling at 100◦C . One could, of course, add some kind
of ceteris paribus clause to the water/boiling law (Davidson 2005 [1993]), but the
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exact same option is available in case of the umeboshi/drooling “pseudo-law”. And
while there might be more different kinds of conditions that prevent hypersalivation
than boiling, that would merely be a difference in degree, and would be insufficient
for the strict distinction between “strict laws” and mere generalizations that Davidson
requires.
My aim here, is not to criticize Davidson’s anomalous monism, however, but to
contrast it to the noisy mental contents picture emerging from Dennett’s pattern anal-
ogy. For the latter it doesn’t matter whether we call the umeboshi case a “law” or a
“generalization”. What does matter is that the thought of umeboshi will correspond to
different — but probably not completely dissimilar — brain activation patterns in dif-
ferent subjects because these different subjects have different histories of encounters
with umeboshi, and therefore, different mental representations of umeboshi. (And
hypersalivation may trigger further memories and associations that also differ from
person to person.) Or, as Davidson once put it, “the correct interpretation of what a
speaker means is not determined solely by what is in the head; it depends also on
the natural history of what is in the head” (2001[1988], p.44).6
2.3. Conceptual representations in the brain
While an analogy may be illustrative and even illuminating, it doesn’t prove any-
thing. The noisy mental contents picture emerging in the preceding sections is also
supported by a growing body of empirical evidence, however. In a review of re-
search on conceptual representations in the brain, Markus Kiefer and Friedemann
Pulvermüller (2012) conclude that concepts are modality-specific, distributed repre-
sentations that are grounded in perception and action and that are partially coded
in the sensory and motor areas of the human brain. Mental representations depend
on experiences with the referent(s) of the concepts (Davidson’s “natural history” or
Kaplan’s “genetic character”), which create conceptual memory traces in modality-
specific parts of the brain. And concepts are flexible and situation-dependent: “they
are comprised of semantic features which are flexibly recruited from distributed, yet
localized semantic maps in modality-specific brain regions depending on contextual
constraints” (p.817). “To summarize, converging evidence indicates that concepts are
flexible, experience-dependent modality-specific representations distributed across
sensory and motor systems” (p.817). “Noise” as a metaphor applied to mental con-
tent referred to exactly this kind of experience-dependence, situation-dependence,
memory-dependence, and so forth (see preceding sections).
“Noise” is the consequence of, among others, different experiences and differ-
ences in memory traces and how they are processed. The brain is not a computer
hard disk or video recorder and memory is not simple retrieval or replay. Rather, re-
membering is a constructive process (Schacter, Norman and Koutstaal 1998; Schac-
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ter, Guerin and St Jacques 2011; Schacter 2012); “remembering involves the on-
line reconstruction of memorial representations from incomplete and disaggregated
episodic information stored in patterns of neural activation across disperse cortical
areas” (De Brigard 2014, p.410). Furthermore, not just our memories of concrete
objects, events and named particulars are “noisy” in this sense, but all our concepts
and other mental representations are. Words and concepts are not (stored as) some
kind of empty abstractions, but activate perceptual and/or motor representations
(Zwaan and Kaschak 2009) and “are typically understood against background situa-
tions” (Barsalou 2009, p.253). And this is not just true of proper names and words we
use for everyday objects, but even of abstract concepts — those too trigger memories
or imaginings of concrete situations (Barsalou and Wierner-Hastings 2005).
All these idiosyncratic details cause “noise”, but rather than obscuring our mental
contents, this noise constitutes them. If it wasn’t for our experiences and memories
of things, we wouldn’t have concepts or mental representations of those things at
all. Nevertheless, even though our mental contents are inherently noisy, we can only
describe them by ignoring much of that noise. No verbal description can do justice to
all of the noisy details, all the memories, all the associations, and all other idiosyn-
crasies that together make up my mental representation of APPLE, your concept of
PEAR, or Hanako’s concept of JOHN’S TOYOTA.
2.4. Analyzing belief contents
Thus far the focus has been on (the noisiness of) mental representations or concepts.
Assuming that Hanako’s beliefs that John drives a Toyota and that John owns a cat
are — in her mind — about the same John, her concept of John must somehow be
part of or involved in both beliefs, and the same applies to other concepts involved
in her beliefs. Concepts, then, are the recurring building blocks of beliefs. But how
exactly a belief is constructed out of these building blocks is less clear.
The simplest analysis of the content of Hanako’s belief that John drives a Toyota
would be that it is an ordered set consisting of her mental representations of JOHN,
DRIVING, and TOYOTA, but that cannot be right. Hanako believes that John drives
some specific Toyota and in some specific way. (It is a green Toyota with a long scratch
on the left passenger door, and with stains on the floor from the time when Hanako
threw up in his car after his driving style made her sick. See section 2.1.) Hence, her
belief doesn’t involve a generic concept TOYOTA (if she has such a generic concept
at all), and neither does it involve a generic concept of DRIVING. It seems an obvious
solution for this problem to substitute JOHN’S DRIVING and JOHN’S TOYOTA for
DRIVING and TOYOTA, respectively, but that won’t work either. Perhaps, John also
owns an antique Peugeot, which he drives very carefully (contrary to the way he
drives his Toyota). Hence, the concept of DRIVING involved isn’t just specific to John,
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but also to John’s Toyota. But even that won’t do, as John may own two Toyotas, one
old and green one, which he drives like a maniac, and one brand new, red one, which
he drives very conservatively. (And even if he would drive both Toyotas in the same
way, JOHN’S TOYOTA would still be insufficiently specific.)
Regardless of how many modifiers are added, the problem doesn’t go away.
JOHN’S GREEN TOYOTA won’t do, because he might have two green Toyotas. And
so forth. What must be kept in mind, however, is that the words in small capitals
are nothing but labels for Hanako’s noisy and idiosyncratic mental representations.
Some labels may be badly chosen, others may be better, but ultimately all of them are
just labels, and rarely will a label be able to do justice to all of the “noise” in what-
ever it is labeling. However, a good label should somehow remind us of the inherent
noisiness of what it is labeling, rather than obscuring it. We could, for example, use
“THAT TOYOTA” to refer to Hanako’s mental representation of John’s Toyota. The
deictic “THAT” seems an appropriate way of capturing the unavoidable incomplete-
ness and context-dependence of the labels used, but prefixing all labels for mental
representations with “THAT” also feels rather uncomfortable. A reconstruction of the
content of Hanako’s belief as 〈THAT JOHN, THAT DRIVING, THAT TOYOTA〉 looks
odd more than appropriate, even if it is an improvement over 〈JOHN, DRIVING,
TOYOTA〉. A better option would be to use some neutral symbol as a reminder of the
fact that these labels are mere labels and not specifications of mental content — an
asterisk will do fine, for example. Then, the content of Hanako’s belief is represented
as 〈*JOHN, *DRIVING, *TOYOTA〉.
The asterisk marks noisiness, but also one of its main implications: uniqueness.
If Hanako’s thought of a Toyota activates different memories, different associations,
and different neural networks than Andrea’s thought of a Toyota, then, even if both
believe that John drives a Toyota, they really believe quite different things. Moreover,
Hanako cannot even have the same belief at two different points in time. Because
of new experiences (including new thoughts) the memories, associations, and neu-
ral networks involved in Hanako’s mental representation *TOYOTA change,7 and
therefore, if Hanako last year believed that John drives a Toyota, and right now
still/also/again believes that John drives a Toyota, then Hanako-now and Hanako-
last-year really believe(d) quite different things. Beliefs are very much like Heracli-
tus’s metaphorical river: it is as impossible to have the same belief twice as it is to
step into the same river twice.
However, if belief reports merely describe beliefs, then, even if Hanako and An-
drea (or Hanako-now and Hanako-last-year) cannot have the same belief, this doesn’t
imply that we can never use the same description of their beliefs in the same context.
It may be perfectly acceptable in some (probably even many) circumstances to report
that both Hanako and Andrea believe that John drives a Toyota, and therefore — in
a sense — share a belief. (See also section 3.1.)
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3. Describing beliefs
In the block quote in section 1 Daniel Dennett observes that there are “different at-
titudes we take at various times toward patterns” (p.35). How we describe frame A
depends on circumstances, purposes, technical limitations, and so forth. The same
applies to how we describe Hanako’s belief. “Sometimes we care about exact descrip-
tion or reproduction of detail, at whatever cost”. What Hanako believes, then, is that
some specific John drives (in some specific way) some specific Toyota, and all of this
needs to be specified in detail. (That this may be impossible in practice is irrelevant
here.) “At other times we care about the noise, but not where in particular it occurs”.
Again, Hanako believes that some specific John drives (in some specific way) some
specific Toyota, but this time we omit the specifications, recognizing the noise, but
not describing it in detail. “And sometimes, we simply tolerate or ignore the noise”.
Then, we just say that Hanako believes that John drives a Toyota. This, of course, is
what we do most of the time, and in many circumstances that is good enough.
As mentioned before, the key question for Dennett is whether bar code is really
there in frame A, but the focus here is on truthful (or faithful) description rather than
on ontology.8 There are “different attitudes we take at various times toward patterns”,
but when is which attitude right or appropriate? When we say that x believes that
p we are ignoring the noise (i.e. we’re taking the third of Dennett’s three attitudes),
but when are we justified to do so, and/or to what extent?
Dennett’s pattern, bar code, describes frame A in figure 1. Similarly, Mark Richard
(1990) and Kent Bach (1997) argue that belief reports describe or represent what
someone believes. “In an attitude ascription we use a sentence to represent what
someone thinks”, writes Richard (p.265), and Bach points out that a belief report
“does not specify what the person believes but merely describes it” (p.215). And as in
Dennett’s analogy, such descriptions can be true, appropriate, faithful, or not depend-
ing on context. Richard suggests that “what counts as faithful representation varies
from context to context with our interests and expectations” (p.3), and according to
Bach, belief reports are “not true or false independently of context” (p.238).
Strictly speaking, to say that some description or expression is “appropriate” (or
“faithful”) is a pragmatic claim, while to say that it is “true” is a semantic claim. I will
not distinguish these two kinds of claims in the following, however. If in a certain con-
text we should care about the “noise” but don’t, then the resulting belief description
is false and inappropriate in that context, and “falsehood” and “inappropriateness”
here mean exactly the same thing. This may seem a sloppy use of terms, but it is im-
portant to realize that under a stricter interpretation of “falsehood” (that is, stricter
than one that effectively identifies it with inappropriateness) all belief descriptions
— except those that specify all noise (but that is impossible) — are false.
Furthermore, the idea that the truth of an imprecise expression depends on the
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context in which that expression is uttered is less exotic than it might seem at first.
“The distance between Paris and Stuttgart is 500km” is true or false depending on
how much precision we require, where exactly we locate the two reference points,
whether we are talking about Euclidean, geodesic, or travel distance, and in case of
the latter, by what means of transportation. If the context is car travel, then the state-
ment is false (because the shortest distance between the two cities by car, depending
on exact starting point and finish, is approximately 620km). If, on the other hand,
the statement is made in a discussion about fuel requirements for airplanes, then it
is true. There is no answer to the question “What is the distance between Paris and
Stuttgart?” that is true in every context. Even if we’d agree on the type of distance
and on the two reference points, different contexts may require different degrees of
precision.
Stuttgart is called Schduagert in Swabian (a regional language or dialect spoken
in Baden-Württemberg and its capital, Stuttgart), and it’s not too difficult to come
up with a scenario in which someone — let’s call him “Hans” — believes that the
distance between Paris and Stuttgart is 500km and the distance between Paris and
Schduagert is 620km (because Hans doesn’t realize that Stuttgart is Schduagert).
This is, of course, a variant of Frege’s puzzle (see section 1). Because Stuttgart is
Schduagert, semantic innocence suggests that “Stuttgart is 620km from Paris” is an
alternative description of Hans’s belief that Schduagert is 620km from Paris, leading
to the attribution of contradictory beliefs.
In case of the more or less “noisy” beliefs implied by Dennett’s pattern analogy,
there is an asymmetrical relation between different descriptions of the same belief.
“John drives a Toyota” is implied by “John drives a green Toyota”, but not the other
way around. Alternative descriptions of the same belief in variants of Frege’s puzzle
are materially equivalent, however. “Stuttgart is 620km from Paris” implies “Schdu-
agert is 620km from Paris” and vice versa. A second important difference between the
two kinds of cases is that while Hanako will almost certainly realize that “John drives
a green Toyota” implies “John drives a Toyota”, Hans will not realize the equivalence
of the two alternative descriptions of his belief about the distance between Stuttgart
and Paris. In this section, the focus will be on more or less “noisy” descriptions of
Hanako’s belief; we’ll turn to Frege’s puzzle and similar cases in section 4.
3.1. Beliefs and descriptions
Traditionally, a belief report is assumed to be a relation between a believer and a
proposition, which is formally represented by means of a two-place predicate B. Thus,
“B(x , p)” means that x believes that p. Dennett’s pattern analogy shows that this
is misleading, however. That is, p is not what x believes, but merely describes it.9
Hence, x has a belief b, which is described by p, and — as suggested by the pattern
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analogy — that description may be true (or appropriate, or faithful) depending on
context c. Rather than “B(x , p)”, then, we should write “∃b[D(x , b)∧S(b, c, p)]” — x
has a belief b, and that belief b is appropriately described as p in (given) context c.10
Applied to the case of Hanako and her belief that John drives a Toyota, the traditional
representation of a belief report (or attitude ascription) is “B(h, t)” in which h stands
for Hanako and t for “John drives a Toyota”. What I’m proposing is that it should
be “∃b[D(h, b)∧S(b, c, t)]” (“Hanako has a belief that is correctly described as ‘John
drives a Toyota’ in the given context”) instead.11
A few things should be noted about this notation. Firstly, it preserves the dyadic
nature of the belief relation. However, rather than assuming that believing is a rela-
tion between a believer and a proposition, it takes believing to be a relation between
a believer and a noisy mental content. Context is, therefore, not a third argument in
believing, but in belief description.
Secondly, if that third argument, context c, is a universally quantified-over vari-
able (rather than a constant) and thus irrelevant, then the two notations are effec-
tively equivalent:
∀x , p[B(x , p)↔∀c∃b[D(x , b)∧ S(b, c, p)]]
Such context-irrelevance (or constancy across contexts) may apply to reports of
beliefs that cannot be (significantly) affected by noise, such as mathematical and
logical truths and, perhaps, other purely abstract beliefs. Hence, if is is true in one
context that Luis believes that one plus one is two, then it is probably true in all
contexts.
Thirdly, p in “S(b, c, p)” describes belief b, which suggests that p is a sentence
rather than a proposition. However, while “John drives a Toyota” and “John fährt
einen Toyota” are different sentences, descriptions of Hanako’s belief by means of
either sentence are true and false in the same contexts (even though they may not be
understood in the same contexts), and consequently — at least in this respect — p in
“S(b, c, p)” is more like a proposition than like a sentence. If p is a proposition, then
a more technically correct reading of the S predicate would be something like “belief
b is appropriately described in (given) context c by a sentence expressing p”. In this
paper I will (mostly) take a shortcut and just write that proposition p describes belief
b, however.
Fourthly, this notation allows us to solve the problem of shared beliefs mentioned
in section 2.4. Recall that Hanako and Andrea (or Hanako-now and Hanako-last-year)
have different mental representations of John and his Toyota and thus cannot, strictly
speaking, have the same belief that John drives a Toyota. Nevertheless, because “John
drives a Toyota” is merely a description of their beliefs (rather than a specification
of their belief contents) there may be a context in which that description correctly
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describes both beliefs. To say that Hanako and Andrea believe the same thing is really
nothing but a loose way of saying that (in the given context) the same sentence
accurately describes what they believe(d). Thus, in this loose sense, x and y share a
belief that p in context c iff:
∃b1 b2[D(x , b1)∧ D(y, b2)∧ S(b1, c, p)∧ S(b2, c, p)]
and that’s all. The two beliefs b1 and b2 are not identical — because it is virtually
impossible for two beliefs to be strictly identical (see sections 2.2 and 2.3) — but
that doesn’t matter; all that matters is that after ignoring the contextually irrelevant
noise the pattern is sufficiently similar to be described in the same way
Fifthly and finally, the separation of description of belief content from attribution
and introduction of beliefs as entities by means of an existential quantifier forces at-
tention on questions about the individuation and identification of beliefs (see also
section 2.1), especially if one takes Quine’s famous dictum “no entity without iden-
tity” seriously. Traditionally, beliefs are identified by their content, but section 2.4
showed that there is no non-problematic way of doing that — because there are
many different ways of describing the content of a belief, and because none of those
descriptions can completely describe the content of a belief, content description does
not fix or identify a belief.
Beliefs are not necessarily identified by their contents, however — they may be
analogous to events in this respect. As Donald Davidson (2001 [1967]) pointed out,
one and the same event can be described in very different terms, and events exist in-
dependently from their descriptions. Consequently, those descriptions do not identify
events. Rather, events are identified by their causes and effects (2001 [1969]) or by
their space-time location (2001 [1985]). Like events, belief contents can be described
in different ways and are (more or less) independent from those descriptions, and
consequently, content-based descriptions don’t identify beliefs. Instead, beliefs are or
could be identified by the cognitive or functional roles they play (i.e. their causes,
effects, associations, overlaps, and so forth), or perhaps — in the case of occurrent
thoughts — by their space-time location. However, of these two supposed alterna-
tives, the second, space-time location, is not applicable to dispositional beliefs, and
the first, functionalism, may not really be an alternative identification criterion at all.
If beliefs play a cognitive role in virtue of their content (and/or if cognitive roles can-
not be determined without appealing to content), and that seems intuitively plausi-
ble, then functionalist identification is not substantially different from content-based
identification.
Perhaps, these problems of individuation and identification are really a conse-
quence of demanding more than we need, however. There is no exact boundary be-
tween the North Sea and the Atlantic ocean, but few people will deny that the North
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Sea exists and most educated people will be able to locate it on a map. (Wittgen-
stein once asked the similar rhetorical question: “If the border between two coun-
tries would be disputed, would it follow that the citizenship of all of their inhabitants
would be put in question?” 1967, §556; my translation.) Something similar may ap-
ply to beliefs.
The interconnectedness of beliefs mentioned in section 2.1 (as well as some of the
other “noise”) suggests that there is no meaningful way to strictly separate supposed
individual beliefs from total belief states (i.e. from everything a person beliefs),12
and thus, that there is no exact boundary between Hanako’s belief t that John drives
a Toyota and (all) her other beliefs. But if the vague boundaries of the North Sea
are no reason to deny the existence of the North Sea, then this is no reason to deny
the existence of Hanako’s belief t either. Furthermore, an inexact description may
be sufficient to pick out Hanako’s belief and refer to it. Hence, while the suggested
representation of the content of Hanako’s belief in section 2.4 as 〈 *JOHN, *DRIVING,
*TOYOTA〉 might have seemed overly sketchy at first, it may very well be the case
that it is all we need.
3.2. The closure principle
Hanako’s belief can be alternatively described as “John drives a Toyota”, “John drives a
green Toyota”, “John drives a Toyota with a long scratch on the left passenger door”,
and so forth. As mentioned above, noisier, more detailed descriptions of Hanako’s
belief entail less noisy descriptions. If p is a noisier description and q a less noisy
description then p→ q.
According to Nicholas Rescher (1960), if some person x believes that p and be-
lieves that p→ q, then she also believes that q (at least implicitly). This is the widely
accepted closure principle of belief — in traditional notation:13
CPB.1 (B(x , p)∧ B(x , p→ q))→ B(x , q)
Because the two-place predicate B ignores the noisiness of beliefs and the related
context-dependence of belief reports (see previous section), “∃b[D(x , b)∧S(b, c, p)]”
needs to be substituted for “B(x , p)”, and so forth, which adds a new argument:
context c. In case of the closure principle, context is assumed to be irrelevant, and
therefore, must be the same throughout: x has beliefs that are correctly described
as p and p → q in one context, and therefore, x has another (implicit) belief that is
correctly described as q in the same context. Hence, we can revise CPB.1 as follows:
CPB.2 ∀x , b1, c, p, q[(D(x , b1)∧ S(b1, c, p)∧ ∃b2[D(x , b2)∧ S(b2, c, p→ q)])→∃b3[D(x , b3)∧ S(b3, c, q)]]
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The case of the more or less noisy descriptions is different from that described
by the closure principle in three fundamental ways, however. Firstly, p and q do
not describe two different beliefs (b1 and b3), but are different descriptions of the
same belief. (In the same way that Dennett’s alternative descriptions of frame A are
just that: different descriptions, not different frames.) Secondly, it matters here that
p→ q and not whether the subject believes that p→ q because there may be contexts
in which it is appropriate to say that x believes that q even if x does not believe that
p → q. And thirdly, there is no reason to assume that the context of the consequent
is necessarily the same as the context of the antecedent.
This third difference is, of course, the point of Dennett’s pattern analogy (as I
interpret it here). That one and the same belief can be described in two different ways
(p and q) and that one of these descriptions is more general than the other (and thus
p → q) does not imply that they are equally appropriate in the same circumstances.
That your neighbor’s house burned down because you torched it implies that your
neighbor’s house burned down, but that does not mean that these two descriptions
of the same event are equally appropriate in all circumstances. The same applies to
beliefs. That p implies q merely implies that there is a (hypothetical) context in which
q describes the same belief, but it does not imply that it is the same context.
Taking these three differences into account, the principle most similar to the clo-
sure principle, but applied to one belief under different descriptions, would be:
CPS ∀x , b, p, q[(D(x , b)∧ ∃c1[S(b, c1, p)]∧ (p→ q))→∃c2[S(b, c2, q)]]
While CPB.2 has three beliefs in one context, CPS has one belief in one or two
contexts. The question about the appropriateness of different “attitudes” we can take
towards the pattern(s) and the noise is a question about those contexts. Specifically,
it is the question when contexts c1 and c2 in CPS are non-overlapping such that the
belief b cannot be described as q in the same context, despite x ′s belief that p (or,
more accurately, despite x ′s belief described as p) and despite the fact that p implies
q. Thus,
NC ∀x , b, p, q[(D(x , b)∧ S(b, c, p)∧ (p→ q)∧φ)→¬S(b, c, q)]
wherein φ stands for the condition that answers the italicized “when” in the previous
sentence.
NC — short for “Non-Closure” — conflicts with CPB.2 if p and q describe the
same belief and if p → q implies that x believes that p → q, unless φ is impossible.
To see this, assume a class of cases in which p and q accurately describe the same
belief (but not necessarily in the same context) and in which the antecedent of NC is
true. Then, NC implies (obviously) that the belief described as b in context c can not
be described as q in the same context. However, from CPB.2 it follows that the same
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belief b is accurately described as q in the same context (because there is only one
context throughout CPB.2).
There are three ways to avoid this contradiction. The most obvious is to assume
that φ cannot be satisfied — but I see no a priori reason to make that assumption.
In the contrary — it is fairly easy to come up with an example of condition φ, as the
following sections will show.
The second is to deny that p → q implies that x believes that p → q. This is
technically correct, of course, but if is obvious that p implies q then it would be un-
charitable to not assume that x believes that p→ q, and if p and q are more and less
noisy descriptions of the same belief then it will often be obvious that p implies q. It
is, for example, rather implausible that Hanako would not realize that “John drives
a green Toyota” implies that “John drives a Toyota”. Hence, while it isn’t necessarily
the case that p → q implies that the believer believes that p → q — there may be
a context in which it is appropriate to say that Hanako believes that John drives a
Japanese car, for example, even if she doesn’t know that Toyota’s are Japanese cars
— in the type of cases considered here x will often (perhaps, even typically) believe
that p→ q.
The third, and only remaining option is to exclude cases in which p and q describe
the same belief (rather than different beliefs) from the closure principle:
CPB.3 ∀x , b1, c1, p, q[(D(x , b1) ∧ S(b1, c1, p) ∧ ∃b2[D(x , b2) ∧ S(b2, c1, p → q)] ∧¬∃c2[S(b1, c2, q)])→∃b3[D(x , b3)∧ S(b3, c1, q)]]
3.3. The principle of (avoiding) deviant implications
Normally, what is true of something under a less detailed description holds true under
a more detailed description as well. What is true of a table is also true of a wooden
table, but not necessarily the other way around, except that “possibly not being made
of wood” is true of the first, but not of the second.14 The same applies to beliefs. If
something non-trivial is true of a belief described as “John drives a Toyota” that is
not true if the same belief is described as “John drives a green Toyota” (and I take
analogues of “possibly not being made of wood” to fall in the “trivial” category),
then something went wrong. But the only thing that can have gone wrong is belief
description, and consequently, (at least) one of the two descriptions is false. Since it
cannot be the more detailed description that is false (for this reason alone), we should
in such cases reject the less detailed (or less “noisy”), more general description. Let’s
call this the principle of (avoiding) deviant implications:
If, in a given context, there is a non-trivial property a belief has under a less
specific description of that belief and not under a more specific description,
then the less specific description is false in that context.
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Formally:
PDI ∀x , b, p, q[(D(x , b) ∧ S(b, c, p) ∧ (p → q) ∧ ¬(q → p) ∧ ∃F¬[F(b, p) ↔
F(b, q)])→¬S(b, c, q)]
wherein F is a (contextually) non-trivial property that b has under one description
and not under the other. (On the condition “¬(q→ p)”, see section 4.)
Since the last conjuncts in the antecedent, “¬(q → p)” and “∃¬F[. . .]”, fill the φ
slot in NC, an instantiation of PDI is an instantiation of NC. However, I doubt that a
property F (that b has or does not have depending on description) is encountered
without first assuming both descriptions, and consequently, PDI seems most likely
to be found in an argument by contradiction (regardless of whether the argument
in question was originally intended as such). That is, if the assumption that q is an
accurate description of a belief b that can also be described as p when p→ q implies
that ∃F¬[F(b, p)↔ F(b, q)], then — by PDI — that assumption is false (at least in
the given context). Or in (other) words, if it is assumed that “John drives a Toyota”
correctly describes a belief that can also be described as “John drives a green Toyota”,
and that assumption has the implication that there is a non-trivial property that that
belief has under one description and not under the other, then that assumption is
false, and thus “John drives a Toyota” is not an appropriate description of that belief
in that context. The next section will illustrate this.
3.4. Gettier cases
Hanako believes that John drives a green Toyota. She has this belief because he has
driven a green Toyota for years (the one with the scratch on the passenger door),
and she has no reason to believe that this has suddenly changed. She is, therefore,
also justified to believe that John drives a green Toyota. Green Toyotas are Toyotas,
and therefore, Hanako believes that John drives a Toyota, and for the same reason
she is justified to believe that.
However, yesterday, unbeknownst to Hanako, John sold his green Toyota and
bought a white Toyota. A white Toyota is still a Toyota, so it is still true that John
drives a Toyota.
Hanako believes that John drives a Toyota. She is justified to believe that John
drives a Toyota. And it is true that John drives a Toyota. Therefore, Hanako knows
(by the definition of knowledge as justified true belief) that John drives a Toyota.
This is, of course, a Gettier case — that is, a supposed counterexample against
the definition of knowledge as justified true belief (Gettier 1963). Some, but not
all Gettier cases fit the same pattern as this example:15 x has a belief that can be
described as p and as q such that p→ q; if it is described as q it counts as knowledge,
but — and that always remains unmentioned — if it is described as p it does not count
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as knowledge (because it is not true under that description). Hence, depending on
description, and without a change of context, the same belief either does or does not
have a non-trivial property, namely: “being knowledge” or “counting as knowledge”.
Let’s quickly go through the steps of the argument to see how it works (or doesnt’t
work, actually). The argument starts with the assumptions that (1) Hanako has a
belief b that in the context C is described as g (“John drives a green Toyota”) and
this belief is justified; that (2) green Toyotas are Toyotas; that (3) John sold his green
Toyota and bought a white Toyota; and (4) that white Toyotas are Toyotas too (and
let’s ignore what Gongsun Long might have to say about this last assumption).16
It obviously follows from (3) and (4) that (5) John drives a Toyota. So, these five
propositions are the start of the argument.
1) D(h, b)∧ S(b, c, g)∧ J(h, b, g) assumption
2) g → t assumption
3) ¬g ∧w assumption
4) w→ t assumption
5) t 3,4, elimination and modus ponens
The only new element in these assumptions is the three-place predicate J . “J(h, b, g)”
means that h (Hanako) is justified to believe b that g (or that h’s belief b that g is
justified). If all “noise” is taken into account, is seems likely that no two beliefs are
completely identical, which means that the first argument (the believer) isn’t strictly
necessary, so perhaps that could be omitted, but the other two arguments cannot.
Beliefs are justified — not propositions — so “J(g)” would make no sense, and “J(b)”
would imply that justification is completely independent from the description of a
belief, or in other words, that a belief described as “John drives a Toyota” has the
exact same justification as a belief described as “John drives a green Toyota”, and as
“John drives a green Toyota with a scratch on the left passenger door”, and so forth.
This seems implausible, and therefore, justification needs at least three arguments.
At least, because I think it should really be a four-place predicate with whatever
justifies the belief in question — the source of justification — filling the fourth place.
This doesn’t matter in the present context, however, so we can ignore the fourth
argument here, but it matters a lot in case of arguments for skepticism based on the
closure principle of justification, for example.
The next step is the assumption that t (“John drives a Toyota”) is also an appro-
priate description of Hanako’s belief b. In Gettier cases that follow this pattern this
assumption is (implicitly) justified by the original, simple version of the closure prin-
ciple of belief CPB.1 (and the assumption that Hanako believes that g → t), but the
re-revised version of the closure principle, CPB.3, doesn’t apply here. Instead, this is
where the proof by contradiction starts.
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6) S(b, c, t) assumption for proof by contradiction
7) J(h, b, t) 1,2,6, elimination and the closure principle
of justification
8) K(h, b, t) 6,5,7, JTB
9) ¬K(h, b, g) 3, elimination and JTB
10) ¬S(b, c, t) 8,9, PDI
11) S(b, c, t)∧¬S(b, c, t) 6,10, conjunction
Line (11) is a contradiction implying that the assumption in line (6) is false and,
therefore, that:
12) ¬S(b, c, t) 6–11, proof by contradiction
There are a few steps in this argument that may need some explanation. (7) and
(8) introduce the closure principle of justification and the traditional definition of
knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), respectively, as well as a new predicate K
for “knows”. The closure principle of justification holds that if x is justified to believe
p and if p → q then x is justified to believe q.17 Knowledge, like justification, is
a three-place predicate here: “K(h, b, t)” means that h’s belief b that t qualifies as
knowledge. (8) follows from the definition of knowledge as JTB,18 the assumption
of belief in (6), the inference of truth in (5), and the inference of justification in (7).
In the Gettier-case interpretation, (6) is not an assumption for indirect proof but
follows from CPB.1, as mentioned above, and after (8) the argument changes: an-
other assumption is added, namely the intuition that b is not knowledge, which leads
to the conclusion that JTB is false. However, CPB.1 was replaced by CPB.3, which
doesn’t apply here (because g and t describe the same belief), and therefore, (6)
doesn’t follow. Instead, (6) must be assumed, and this turns out to be an assumption
in a proof by contradiction.
Because the first conjunct of (3) is ¬g, JTB implies that h’s belief b that g is not
knowledge (9). Therefore, b is knowledge if described as t (8) and not knowledge if
described as g (9). This means that there is a non-trivial property — namely “being
knowledge” — that b has under one description and not under the other, and in
that case, PDI implies that the more general description t is false (10), which leads
to a contradiction (11). Therefore, (12) in this context it is false to say that Hanako
believes that John drives a Toyota (or, Hanako’s belief cannot be accurately described
as “John drives a Toyota” in the given context). This particular case, then, fails as a
counterargument against JTB (but that does not imply that all Gettier cases fail).
It should be obvious that the foregoing depends on the identification of the beliefs
described as “John drives a green Toyota” and “John drives a Toyota” as one and the
same belief. The brief discussion of the problem of individuation and identification of
beliefs in section 3.1 concluded that beliefs are best identified by their content, and
section 2.4 suggested that the best possible representation of the content of Hanako’s
PRINCIPIA 23(1): 19–51 (2019)
42 Lajos L. Brons
belief is something like 〈*JOHN, *DRIVING, *TOYOTA〉 in which the asterisk repre-
sents the unavoidable incompleteness and context-dependence of the labels used.
These labels — “*JOHN”, “*DRIVING”, and so forth — are just that: labels. They
name (and thus, refer to) mental representations, but due to “noise” (see section
2), they cannot possibly fully describe them. Only sufficient knowledge about con-
text and about Hanako’s beliefs can clarify whether two descriptions of what Hanako
believes are descriptions of the same belief or of two different beliefs.
Furthermore, there are no shortcuts. Alternative descriptions of Hanako’s belief
thus far all have the form “John drives a . . . Toyota”, wherein zero or more adjectives
and/or descriptive phrases are substituted for “. . . ”, but this pattern is not a useful
way of identifying sentences as being descriptions of the same belief — there almost
certainly are circumstances in which “John drives a car” or even “John drives” are
acceptable descriptions of the same belief. And similarly “John” can be replaced by
a long list of contextually appropriate descriptions. On the other hand, if Hanako
infers from her belief that John probably has a driving license, then that is not a
plausible description of the same belief — that is a new belief, even if it has close
ties to the original belief.19 “John drives a Japanese car” is a much more ambiguous
case. Perhaps, it could be a description of the same belief, or perhaps it really is
a different, implicit belief. It would require a lot of knowledge about Hanako and
her beliefs to decide which it is. (On the distinction between implicit beliefs and
alternative descriptions of the same belief, see also section 2.1. The argument in the
last paragraphs of section 3.1 — including Wittgenstein’s rhetorical question — also
applies here: that there are cases that are hard to classify does not imply that all cases
are hard to classify.)
The practical problem of deciding whether two propositions describe the same
belief or two different beliefs (in particular cases) is only of limited relevance here,
however. The case of Hanako and John’s Toyota presented in this section illustrates
PDI and thus when a more general, less “noisy” description of a belief is false. That
it may be more difficult in some other cases to see whether two sentences describe
the same belief or two different beliefs does not matter for this illustration.
4. Frege’s and Kripke’s puzzles
PDI (see section 3.3) does not apply to variants of Frege’s puzzle (see section 1). In
fact, the condition “¬(q→ p)” in PDI explicitly excludes them. If “Superman is strong”
and “Clark Kent is strong” are materially equivalent and both are possible descriptions
of Lois Lane’s belief b, then “Lois Lane accepts x as an accurate description of her
belief b” (or the opposite!) would be an example of F(b, x). Regardless of which
description of Lois Lane’s belief one would choose as p, the other description would
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then be false, and consequently, a version of PDI without “¬(q → p)” would lead
to paradox. Therefore, PDI cannot apply to variants of Frege’s puzzle (but perhaps
that should have been obvious as PDI is about more or less “noisy” descriptions and
Frege’s puzzle cannot be understood in such terms; see section 3). This, of course,
means that another criterion is necessary to decide between materially equivalent
descriptions of the same belief.
The root of Frege’s puzzle is that the names “Superman” and “Clark Kent” refer to
the same individual and are, therefore, generally assumed to be intersubstitutable,
but there is something very peculiar about this idea, even if it may seem intuitively
plausible. Take the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Superman is strong”. In that
sentence, “Lois Lane” refers to Lois Lane and “Superman” to Superman. Whether
and to what “believes” and “is strong” refer is controversial, so I’ll ignore those terms
here. Importantly, this sentence is a belief report, so it must also somehow refer to the
belief it is supposed to report. But then what refers to that belief? The only possible
answer is the that-clause. That is, “Superman is strong” refers to Lois Lane’s belief.
“Superman is strong” is not the content of Lois Lane’s belief — it is merely a de-
scription, a tool to pick it out and talk about it (i.e. to refer to it), and it cannot be
more than that. Belief contents are too “noisy” to be pinned down and described com-
pletely (see sections 2.1 and 2.3). The best we can do (in many, but probably not all
cases) is to say that the content of Lois Lane’s belief is something like 〈*SUPERMAN,
*STRONG〉 (see section 2.4). It is not the case, however, that this implies that “Su-
perman” also refers to Lois Lane’s mental representation *SUPERMAN — rather, “Su-
perman is strong” refers to Lois Lane’s belief as a whole.
What is peculiar about the assumption of intersubstitutionality is that it ignores
reference to the belief — even though the context is a belief report. A substitution
of “Clark Kent” for “Superman” does not just change the name used to refer to one
and the same individual, but also changes the expression used to refer to Lois Lane’s
belief, and that change cannot be ignored. If “Clark Kent is strong” is not an accurate
description of Lois Lane’s belief, then this substitution makes the belief report false
because it no longer succeeds in referring to Lois Lane’s belief. The question, then,
is what makes a belief report false (but as mentioned a few paragraphs back, PDI
cannot answer this question in case of Frege’s puzzle-type cases).
Perhaps, the most obvious answer (which was already suggested above) is that
Lois Lane would deny that she believes that Clark Kent is strong. Or in other words,
a belief description is false if the believer would not recognize that description as a
description of her belief. This answer doesn’t work, however, if we want to attribute
beliefs to animals. Recall that John has a cat. This cat is normally very fond of John,
but if John puts on a long brown coat and a hat, then his cat doesn’t recognize him
and hides behind the couch. In other words, both “John’s cat believes that the man in
the brown coat is scary” and “John’s cat does not believe that John is scary” are true,
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which is, of course, just another variant of Frege’s puzzle (or of Quine’s Ortcutt case
— see section 1). John’s cat, however, cannot affirm or reject any description of its
beliefs.
Even though Lois Lane’s belief that “Superman is strong” refers to her belief
〈*SUPERMAN, *STRONG〉 as a whole (see above), there is an obvious — and proba-
bly necessary — relation between the components of that belief description and that
representation of her mental content. For the belief description to be true, “Super-
man” must somehow map to Lois Lane’s mental representation *SUPERMAN, and so
forth. Because it does, “Superman is strong” is a (contextually) correct description
of her belief. “Clark Kent is strong”, on the other hand, is a false description of her
belief, because Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent and Superman are two different
individuals and, therefore, “Clark Kent” cannot possibly map to her mental represen-
tation *SUPERMAN. Similarly, “John is scary” is a false description of the cat’s belief,
because “John” cannot possibly map to the cat’s mental representation of the man in
the brown coat.
The general principle is that a belief report is false if it reports a belief by means of
a name or description that refers to x but that cannot map to a mental representation
of x in the believer’s mind. This may seem to put much weight on the notion of map-
ping names and descriptions to mental representations, but we don’t need to know
how exactly such mapping works — all we need is the ability to recognize when a
mapping cannot possibly be right; for example, because the name or description ob-
viously maps to a mental representation of what the subject believes to be something
or someone else entirely.
In Naming and Necessity, Kripke (1980) suggested two further puzzles that seem
superficially similar to Frege’s puzzle, but that cannot be solved by the principle sug-
gested in the previous paragraph. In Kripke’s first puzzle, the monolingual Frenchman
Pierre learns about London — known to him as Londres — and comes to believe that
London is pretty. Some time later, he actually ends up in (a rather dreary part of)
London, not knowing it is the same city he knows as Londres, learns English, and
comes to believe that London is not pretty. In the second puzzle, Peter learns about a
musician named “Paderewski” and forms the belief that Paderewski has musical tal-
ent. He also learns about a politician of that same name, and thinking that politicians
cannot be good musicians, he believes that that Paderewski does not have musical
talent. He doesn’t realize, however, that the two Paderewski’s are really the same.
Hence, it appears that Pierre and Peter have contradictory beliefs about London and
Paderewski, respectively: Pierre believes that London is pretty and not pretty, and
Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent and does not have musical talent.
In these puzzles the same name (or almost the same in case of Londres) maps to
two different mental representations, and thus the principle solving Frege’s puzzle
suggested above doesn’t work here. But these two puzzles are solved by PDI. Recall
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that (almost) any belief has more and less noisy (possible) descriptions (the belief
that 1 + 1 = 2 may be an exception), and that according to PDI a less specific (or
less noisy) description of a belief is false if it has “deviant implications” (meaning
that the belief has a non-trivial property under one description and not under the
other — see section 3.3). In the case of Peter/Paderewski, the more general belief
descriptions “Paderewski has musical talent” and “Paderewski does not have musical
talent” have the non-trivial property of implying that Peter has contradictory beliefs,
while the more specific belief descriptions that “Paderewski-the-musician has musical
talent” and “Paderewski-the-politician does not have musical talent” do not have that
property, and therefore — by PDI — the more general belief descriptions are false.
In the case of Pierre/London there is a similar neglect of noise leading to apparent
paradox. More specific belief descriptions — such as references to different parts or
faces of London — avoid attributing contradictory beliefs.
Kripke’s two puzzles and the use of PDI to solve them differ from the Gettier case
discussed in section 3.4 in two important ways, however. Firstly, in the Gettier case
both the more and less “noisy” descriptions (i.e. p and q in PDI) are given, but in
Kripke’s puzzles only the overly general descriptions are given and better, more spe-
cific descriptions need to be inferred from the stories. Secondly, and perhaps more
importantly, in case of Kripke’s puzzles PDI is applied to two beliefs at once (i.e. to
Peter’s beliefs about a musician and about a politician, and to Pierre’s beliefs about
London and Londres), while in the Gettier case there is only one belief (namely that
John drives a certain car). Consequently, this solution of Kripke’s puzzles illustrates
that the application of PDI isn’t necessarily as simple and straightforward as the Get-
tier case may have suggested.
5. Charity
In Dennett’s pattern analogy beliefs are analogous to “frames”, more or less “noisy”
bands of 90 × 10 black and white dots (see section 1 and figure 1). Depending on
context and needs, we can take different attitudes towards these frames and their
description. Sometimes we need lots of detail; in other cases we can “tolerate or
ignore the noise” and describe a frame by means of a simple pattern like bar code.
Similarly, we (can) take different attitudes towards describing and reporting beliefs.
Sometimes we need a more detailed description; at other times we can tolerate or
ignore the noise. “What counts as faithful representation varies from context to con-
text with our interests and expectations” (Richard 1990, p.3). We can never specify
all the noise, however — beliefs are too noisy for that.
Beliefs are noisy because they are constructed out of mental representations that
are richer, more detailed, and more idiosyncratic than any description could ever
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fully express (see sections 2.1 and 2.3; note that some abstract beliefs like the belief
that 1+ 1 = 2 may be exceptions). A report that Hanako believes that John drives a
Toyota, for example, ignores that what Hanako really believes is that some specific
John drives some specific Toyota in some specific way. Those details may very well
be irrelevant in the given context, but that doesn’t imply that all details are irrelevant
in all contexts. Often we can tolerate or ignore the noise, but sometimes we need to
specify some of it.
It is commonly assumed that belief reports specify beliefs. Thus, in the report
that Hanako believes that John drives a Toyota, the latter part, “John drives a Toy-
ota”, supposedly specifies what Hanako believes. But the inherent noisiness of beliefs
implies that this “specification assumption” (Bach 1997) is false. Belief contents can-
not be identified with propositions, and belief reports do not specify beliefs. The
traditional view exerts an extraordinarily strong pull, however, and is implicitly as-
sumed in the classification of beliefs as “propositional attitudes” — that is, attitudes
we take towards particular propositions — but it should not be forgotten that we
do not directly observe beliefs. We do not even observe our own beliefs (Carruthers
2011). Rather, “beliefs are theoretical entities postulated for the sake of predicting
and explaining behavior” (Klausen 2013, p.190). The common idea that belief con-
tents are like propositions — sometimes called “propositionalism” — is not based on
observation or evidence, but on introspection and conjecture, and that introspection
and conjecture is itself based on an overly simplistic and outdated picture of minds
and mental contents. Contrary to that picture, real minds are noisy (see section 2.3).
Belief reports, then, do not specify beliefs. The expression “John drives a Toyota”
does not tell us what exactly Hanako’s belief is. Rather, it picks out, describes, and
refers to what Hanako believes. Kent Bach (1997) defends a very similar view, but
there are three important differences between his approach and mine.
Firstly, Bach’s argument is based on an analysis of Frege’s puzzle and related
puzzles about belief reports and is largely a priori. Furthermore, the nature of belief
contents does not play a central role in Bach’s argument. In contrast, my argument
starts with an analogy, but after unpacking that analogy, the foundations of the argu-
ment are empirical, and belief content takes center stage. The “noisiness” of beliefs
and mental representation that refutes propositionalism is largely due to what David
Kaplan (1968; see section 1) called the “genetic character” of names and descriptions
(see sections 2.1 and 2.2), or to what Donald Davidson called “the natural history of
what is in the head” (2001 [1988], p.44), and there is growing empirical evidence
that mental contents are “noisy” in this sense (see section 2.3). That is, mental rep-
resentations are experience-dependent (and thus idiosyncratic), context-dependent,
flexible, and modality-specific.
Secondly, Bach stresses that his descriptivism is not a “hidden-indexical theory
in disguise” because it maintains the dyadic nature of “believes”, which implies that
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belief reports do not tacitly refer to context or anything else. In my view, on the
other hand, context is an argument, but in a less straightforward way than typically
assumed in hidden-indexicalism. A belief report combines an attribution of a belief,
which is a psychological (or mental) entity (see section 2.4), with a propositional or
sentential description of that belief, but because the same belief can be described in
different ways (as illustrated both by Frege’s puzzle and Dennett’s pattern analogy),
attribution and description need to be separated (see section 3.1).20 Of these two
relations, belief attribution is dyadic, but the two arguments are a believer and a
noisy mental content (i.e. a belief) (rather than a believer and a proposition), and
belief description is triadic — its arguments are a belief, a propositional or sentential
description, and a context. An important implication of this view is that belief reports
can be true or false (even if their truth or falsity depends on context), while according
to Bach they are semantically incomplete.
Thirdly, and closely related to this last point, there is a difference in focus. Bach’s
paper is a contribution to a debate about belief ascription that started with Frege’s
puzzle, and consequently, he focuses on defending his descriptivism vis-à-vis compet-
ing theories. My focus is less on defending descriptivism (mainly because I don’t think
it needs a defense) and more on a question that follows from the fact that the same
belief can be described in different ways (i.e. more or less “noisy” as in Dennett’s
analogy, or by means of alternative coreferring names or descriptions in variants of
Frege’s puzzle), namely: How to choose between competing descriptions? Or: What
makes a belief report that appears to be truthful from one perspective or in one con-
text false in another?
Two “principles” were suggested in this paper in an attempt to (at least par-
tially)21 answer this question (or these questions). The first and most important is the
principle of (avoiding) deviant implications (PDI; see section 3.3), which holds that
if there is a non-trivial property a belief has under one description and not under
another then the more general description is false in that context. While it could be
argued that any description or representation of a belief that does not violate this
principle is right in a given context, in most cases more economical descriptions are
preferable. Specifying (much) more detail than necessary is not a virtue. For this rea-
son, if PDI is the only applicable principle, then a more general rule could be that the
right description or representation of a belief is the most (or nearly most) general
description that does not have “deviant implications” (i.e. does not violate PDI).
The second, nameless principle was suggested in the discussion of Frege’s puz-
zle in section 4. Like PDI, it is based on descriptivism and on the fact that mental
representations are “noisy”, but while PDI applies to descriptions that are noisy to
different degrees (i.e. more or less specific), this principle applies to cases of appar-
ently equivalent belief descriptions differing only in the name or description used to
refer to something the reported belief is about. According to this principle, a belief
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report is false if it reports a belief by means of a name or description that refers to
something but that cannot possibly map to a mental representation of that something
in the believer’s mind. For example, “Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is strong” is a
false report of Lois Lane’ belief that Superman is strong because “Clark Kent” cannot
possibly map to Lois Lane’s mental representation of Superman (because she doesn’t
know that Clark Kent is Superman).
Like PDI, this second principle has the purpose of avoiding the attribution of con-
tradictory or otherwise irrational or deviant beliefs, but this suggests that both princi-
ples are really just specific versions of the principle of charity. “Serious deviations from
fundamental standards of rationality are more apt to be in the eye of the interpreter
than in the mind of the interpreted”, wrote Donald Davidson (2004 [1986], p.204).
Similarly, belief descriptions with deviant (i.e. contradictory, paradoxical, incoherent,
or irrational) implications are more apt to be due to a mistake by the interpreter than
to accurately describe what is in the mind of the believer.
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Notes
1Semantic innocence implies that a term has the same sense in all contexts, but “Clark
Kent” in Lois Lane’s belief that Clark Kent is not strong does not have the same sense as
“Clark Kent” in the proposition that Clark Kent is Superman (which is true in the universe of
Superman, but unknown to Lois Lane).
2This definition is a paraphrase of the definition given by Kaplan on p.203, differing mainly
in the substitution of symbols consistent with those used here.
3Although Daniel Dennett gave me permission to use the original figure, the only scan
available was of such low quality that it added another (unintentional) level of noise. For
that reason, I redrew frame A (which is referred to below) and recreated the other 5 frames
following the procedure described in Dennett’s paper (except that I used real random num-
bers from random.org).
4There are significant differences even in this respect. Congenital conditions (such as
aphantasia) and brain damage affect which parts of the brain are involved in memory, but
thereby also the form those memories take and how they are connected to other mental
activity.
5That there are no exact correspondences between content-based types of mental events
or states and types of brain activation pattern does not in itself imply or require anomalism.
Strictly speaking, it doesn’t even refute reductionism. It merely makes reduction (of mental
events and contents to brain states) impossible in practice, except perhaps — as suggested
by the aforementioned neuroscientist — in single subjects and within a short time span.
6David Kaplan (1968) referred to this “natural history of what is in the head” as the “ge-
netic character” of a name. See section 1.
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7This raises questions about the identity over time of mental representations, of course,
but that issue is no more complicated or puzzling than identity over time in general, and
much of the same arguments and solutions apply.
8The analogous ontological question would be whether “John drives a Toyota” is really
there (in Hanako’s mind) when or if Hanako believes that John drives a Toyota, but that
question doesn’t seem to make much sense. At least, I have no clue what exactly it means for
a proposition to “be there” (in someone’s mind).
9Recall the quote by Bach in section 1: a belief report “does not specify what the person
believes but merely describes it” (1997, p.215).
10The “D” comes from Greek “doxa”; the “S” stands for “deScribe”. I’m using “D” instead
of “B” to avoid confusion with the traditional dyadic relation B between a believer and a
proposition.
11Kaplan (1968) also separated belief attribution from representation, but in an impor-
tantly different way: “R(α, y, x)∧xB_α is F ^” stands for “a belief of x that y is F if represented
as α” (see also section 1). The most important differences are that Kaplan’s formalization is
designed especially for Frege’s puzzle-type cases and is not applicable to beliefs that don’t fit
the “α is F” pattern (such as the belief that John drives a Toyota), and that it lacks a context
argument.
12Donald Davidson (2001 [1983]) made a similar point when he wrote that “there is no
useful way to count beliefs” (p.138). See also Brons (2016).
13I’m not aware of anyone rejecting the closure principle of belief. Robert Nozick (1981)
famously rejected the related closure principle of knowledge, but did not reject the closure
principle of belief. (See p.208.) However, in this paper I argue for a restriction of the closure
principle (see CPB.3), and if the closure principle is defined as a universal and exceptionless
“law” then such a restriction is effectively a rejection.
14Something like this exception was suggested to me by an anonymous referees of this
journal. I owe that referee my gratitude for that suggestion.
15See, for example, the Gettier case in Audi (2011, pp.248–7). Of the two cases in Gettier’s
(1963) paper, the first can be interpreted as fitting in this pattern, but the second cannot.
16The classical Chinese philosopher Gongsun Long famously argued that a white horse is
not a horse. (Or perhaps he just claimed that it is or can be permissible to say that a white
horse is not a horse. There is considerable debate about the interpretation of Gongsun Long’s
White Horse Dialogue.)
17∀x , b, p, q[(J(x , b, p)∧ (p→ q))→ J(x , b, q)]
18∀x , b, p[K(x , b, p)↔de f (D(x , b)∧ S(b, c, p)∧ J(x , b, p)∧ p)]
19The reason that the above reconstruction of this particular kind of Gettier case doesn’t
show the failure of Gettier cases in general is that there are many Gettier cases in which the
second belief is unambiguously a new belief.
20Kaplan (1968) also separated belief attribution from belief representation. See section 1
and note 11 (i.e. the third note in section 3.1).
21It is quite possible that further rules or principles need to be added, but I have no clue
what those could be.
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